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The recent attack by Ros Wright, Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) (see Amicus Curiae, Issue 12, p. 12) on the 
tactics adopted by defence lawyers in serious fraud trials is both 
unjustified and misleading.
Her argument that it is in the 'defence's interests to prolong 
the trial process for as long as possible ... keeping the issues 
blurred and unclear' simply does not match with reality.
The SFO's latest annual report acknowledges that 'fraud trials 
are inevitably lengthy, complex and demanding'. The Criminal 
Justice Act 1987 sets out the legislative framework for the 
management of serious fraud cases whereby judges have power 
to control the timetable.
Until a criminal case is transferred to the Crown Court, the 
prosecution sets the pace of the proceedings. Thereafter, the 
defence have to appear in court in order, for example, to enter 
pleas and attend preparatory hearings. Often delays occur 
because of practical problems such as difficulties in obtaining a 
court for the length of trial envisaged or because of counsel's 
availability. Both prosecution and defence lawyers are unable to 
obtain adjournments of court hearings without good cause. The 
judge must consider each application on its individual merits.
It is all too easy for the SFO to shirk responsiblity for the 
delays. Despite attempts at streamlining indictments, the SFO 
are still putting far too many counts on indictments making trials 
unnecessarily lengthy and unwieldy. This appears to be done as 
much out of fear of further public criticism for failing to do a 
thorough job as a desire to bring the defendant to book.
Trial judges are still not robust enough in using their powers 
to tackle identification of the key issues directly at preparatory 
hearings, with the result that proceedings are inevitably drawn 
out. Preparatory hearings enable judges to streamline the main 
issues in a fraud case for the better management of the trial and 
the benefit of the jury.
Notwithstanding their draconian powers of investigation and 
prosecution, the SFO are blighted by an inadequate and 
ineffectual use of s. 2 notices and interviews; long drawn-out 
investigations [an on-going case has been investigated for five 
years] and their inability to 'see the wood for the trees.'
The most recent example of the SFO's inflexible approach is 
Butte Mining, one of Britain's longest-running fraud actions, 
which took the SFO five years to investigate. The trial lasted 187 
days, with three of the four defendants convicted, at a cost of 
£5m in legal aid.
One of the major reasons for the delay was the prosecution's 
insistence on presenting evidence on both the alleged mining 
fraud, and benefits fraud despite clear indications from the judge 
that mining fraud evidence need not be adduced. The inflexible 
stance of the SFO meant that 5 '/a months of the trial were 
occupied in hearing evidence which the jury, by their verdicts, 
clearly rejected.
The prosecution may take years to investigate and prepare a 
case with the assistance of substantial resources and the benefit
of a government budget. It is only right that the defence should 
be allowed a reasonable time-frame in which to examine and test 
the prosecution's case. In practice, the defence are allowed an 
infinitely shorter time in which to do this and yet are still subject 
to allegations of 'delaying tactics' by the prosecution.
The SFO continue to ignore the impact of art. 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights at their peril. Under art. 
6(1) 'everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time'.
Attacking legitimate defence case preparation will no longer 
be an acceptable excuse for delays where potential breaches of 
human rights are at stake.
The Commissioner of the City of London Police recently 
blamed foreign judicial authorities for delay in his officers 
investigating cases of alleged fraud. Increasingly the prosecuting 
authorities appear to be blaming everyone but themselves for the 
inadequacies of the current system of investigating and 
prosecuting serious fraud.
The pendulum of enforcement appears to be'swinging too far 
in the prosecution's favour with, for example, the slow erosion 
of the right to silence in serious fraud cases, the relevance of
o
unused material to the defence's case being left to the subjective 
opinion of the prosecuting authorities, and now the current 
trend towards the abolition of juries in serious fraud trials.
Jurors in serious fraud trials are accused of lacking the 
intelligence sufficiently to comprehend serious and complex 
fraud. The Law ommission is currently reviewing a number of 
potential reforms to trial by jury in serious fraud cases and the 
Lord Chief Justice, Lord Bingham has recently advocated the 
abolition of the jury in such cases as they place 'too much of a 
burden' on jurors (Financial Times, 8 October 1998).
The current cycle of blame for delays has dangerous 
implications for civil liberties as the hidden agenda clearly 
appears to be the abolition of a centuries-old right to trial by jury 
for defendants facing allegations of serious and complex fraud. 
Unfortunately, the eradication of this right appears based on 
little or no hard evidence and much speculation.
As Honess, Levi and Charman (Crim LR 1998, 763-773) point 
out in their recent study on juror competence following a 
simulation of the Maxwell trial:
'it is jar from clear to us that the complete abolition of the jury 
system for complex fraud trials is warranted on the grounds of "cognitive 
unfitness". Moreover it is unlikely to increase public confidence in the 
outcomes. Judicial and tribunal options reduce the stake of the ordinary 
system in criminal justice matters with some screening and more focused 
help for the jury, non-specialist jurors are sufficiently competent to 
understand and deal with the information relevant to their verdicts.'  
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